Monday, February 1, 2010

And the poor shall inherit the earth...

In hearing the news of the A's signing Ben Sheets for $10 million last week, I'm positive A's fans jaws hit the floor in droves. Beane and the A's have become synonymous with post-prime veteran signings so the fact that they pursued Sheets didn't shock anyone, it was the $10 mil we ponied up. While some may argue that this could turn out to be a great deal if Sheets pitches up to potential and doesn't become a permanent member of the DL in mid-May (a-la Mr. Harden), I prefer the wait-and-see approach. My focus instead lies on an underlying trend that is coming to define the way smaller clubs can compete.

First, a few distinctions are necessary before some of my close Yankee friends (you know who you are) simply categorize this and other signings as simply publicity stunts by a GM that doesn't care about winning, but only selling tix and turning a profit. THE A'S ARE POOR and their owners are cheap. Most intelligent fans understand that poor teams must operate differently than the elite/wealthy but that's an entirely different article all together.
For this post, we should look at just one facet of the overall strategy: Draft picks. Anyone who follows a small market team or who has read Moneyball understands that draft picks mean substantially more to teams like the A's as opposed to teams that can afford to sign established players. We also know that drafting players is a toss-up. For every Tim Lincecum there are 10 Craig Italianos (who?--exactly!) and teams are simply making educated guesses with a large factor being luck. So laws of probability would tell us that having more draft picks will generally increase the odds of landing a stud down the road. But while teams are compensated with one draft pick when a player leaves via FA, there is no other way to acquire picks or even trade down for more picks. Teams must therefore acquire post-draft talent. Acquiring prospects becomes a strategy in itself: when to dump your veterans, when to trade prospects for more prospects, when to trade prospects for immediate help, etc... What I believe Beane has done, is find a way to buy prospects. That's right, he can defy the Baseball Gods and do what even a fat check from Cashman cannot.

Here is how it's done: First you find a gamble such as Ben Sheets, someone who is maybe coming off injury, or a bad year, or simply a player that needs to prove himself. Then you determine how much you can spend on that player (the A's payroll was substantially less this year compared with last year and thus they had capital to burn) and then give it to him. There are then two outcomes, one good and one bad as with any gamble. Obviously if Sheets shits the bed the A's will have wasted 10 mil, but if he meets the high expectations the A's esentially have 10 mil. to spend on prospects. Many believe the A's will not be in contention, and if that's the case, a contender or "faux-contender" (hello Mets!) will surely come knocking, and because teams tend to overspend when it comes to making a late season playoff push, the seller has the upper hand. The A's simply trade Sheets for a few quality prospects increasing your minor league talent pool and increasing the odds of landing the Tim Lincecum making small change for his first few years.
What has happened is Beane has paid 10 mil. for prospects in a year when the A's will have a tough time competing anyway and he hasn't given up any prospects in return which is the important thing. All that is required is money to gamble with, patience, and a desperate sucker to give up the most valuable commodity to a small-market team: prospects. While sign-and-trades are nothing new, I do believe gambling for prospects is a new way of looking at the small-market strategy.

2 comments:

  1. I hadn't thought of the draft picks angle, but it makes sense within that context as well. I also look at this as Beane doing for his pitching staff what he's done with his batting order-- gambling on an oft-injured or older person who flies under the radar a bit to maybe catch fire and watch the team and particularly the younger guys who you aren't expecting a ton out of rally around him. This was what the 2006 A's did with Frank Thomas and, to a certain extent, Esteban Loaiza. Though $10 million is a lot of money, I think it makes sense within that context.

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